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Abstract. This article describes political psychologies supporting United States (US) sanctions-related 
behavior towards the People's Republic of China's (PRC) exporting of missiles, missile components, and 
missile technology. 
 
The recent history of US Government (USG) sanctions reactive to PRC exporting of missiles, missile 
components, and missile technology might appear puzzling at first blush. In 1991, sanctions were 
announced and implemented reactive to the PRC aiding Pakistan's missile program in the late 1980s. 
These sanctions were lifted in 1992. In 1993, sanctions were announced and implemented reactive to 
additional PRC aid for Pakistan's missile program. These sanctions also were lifted the following year 
reactive to PRC promises to comply with the main aspects of the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Now in November 2000, the US is once again allowing US companies to apply for licenses to launch 
satellites on PRC rockets, because the PRC has promised to stop selling missile-related components and 
technology--at least what would be placed on a "banned for export" list. Is the above but a litany of the 
US rewarding the PRC for promises about nonproliferation instead of nonproliferation? Or is this not 
even the right question? 
 
Part of the problem involves the intended consequences of sanctions. One might argue that sanctions 
are only to proximally punish a perpetrator for undesired behavior without any distal consequences 
regarding that perpetrator's undesired behavior. If this were the case, the USG may be appropriately 
punishing the PRC as to substance and severity and then appropriately removing the punishment. 
Instead, one might argue that sanctions are to rehabilitate transgressors trough extinction of undesired 
behavior. If this were the case, the USG seems to be failing. However, the timing until "kicking in" of the 
intended rehabilitation may be much longer than expected. Moreover, the extinction of undesired 
behavior often is characterized by a period or periods of continued, sporadic, or even exacerbated 
undesired behavior. So the jury may still be out on success or failure. Of course a third possibility is that 
one might argue that sanctions are to deter potential transgressors. Observers ready to label USG 
sanctions as failures would then be accused of looking in the wrong place, if these observers cited 
continued PRC misbehavior as data supporting an opinion on the sanctions. 
 
It is also quite possible that USG policymakers have concluded that little in the way of sanctions can 
affect PRC policymakers, decision makers, or their behavior. But given that policymakers and decision 
makers are supposed to, well, make policy and decisions, and that policy and decisions in the eyes of 
one's citizenry is most often perceived as "doing something about something," then something has to be 
done. Sanctions are then intended to be that something being done, even if that something will not do 
much of anything at all. In this, the USG may be quite successful indeed. (See Adams-Webber, J.R. 
(1969). Generalized expectancies concerning the locus of control of reinforcements and the perception 
of moral sanctions. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 8, 340-343; Allen, G.F. (1987). Where 
are we going in criminal justice? Some insights from the Chinese criminal justice system. International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 31, 101-110; Caputo, G.A. (2000). The "voice 
of justice" vs. the "voice of care" in the assignment of criminal sanctions. Current Psychology: 
Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19, 70-81; Tsebelis, G. (1990). Are sanctions effective? A 
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game-theoretic analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, 3-28; Wesley, F. (1986). Why sanctions fail. 
Organization Development Journal, 4, 68-70.) (Keywords: People's Republic of China, Proliferation, 
Sanctions, Weapons of Mass Destruction.) 
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